Published
by Just-Web Research Institute [16th October, 2019]
HISTORICAL
OVERVIEW OF MAGHREB UNION
BY
DEEDENWII, BARITURE N.
(ND, D.cl)
+2347012543482
and +2349050517580
INTRODUCTION
In today's world it is increasingly
difficult for non-integrated countries to be either economically or politically
viable. It is simply not sustainable for countries to be isolated in their own
bubble; those nations should overcome their competitive mindset and search for
ways to cooperate with their peers. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is an Economic
Integration block comprising of five member states in North Africa. It was
founded in 1989 to embrace and promote economic development of member states.
When it was founded, member states agreed on an implementation time table. A
time table set out tasks that were to be accomplished within specific times;
this was done in accordance to standards of integration and against the
background of the needs of states in member states. Among the objectives set in
the establishing treaty was that, state leaders of the member states would be
meeting annually to make decisions as the highest organ. However after five
meetings, the leaders stopped meeting and have never met until now.
Moreover,
economic integration is a process that demands that states accomplish certain
requirements before they are fully integrated as economic blocks. None of these
requirements was achieved and neither did the Arab Maghreb member states attempt
to pursue them. This demonstrated that, integration in AMU had challenges which
inhibited integration. From a far, the challenges appear to be pegged on
national interest of member states, for instance the secession of Western
Sahara state' and the rivalry among member states. However, upon close
analysis, it emerged that, the main challenge to integration in the Arab
Maghreb Union were centered on the interests of state leaders.
The state
leaders in most Arab Maghreb member states have been in power for decades, thus
running the states akin too personal property. The interests of state leaders
are a concern for integration. Successful integration requires that, states
engage in activities that are purely oriented to promote economic prosperity.
However, in the Arab Maghreb union, state leaders promote political' interests
in place of economic goals. In this study political interests are examined as
challenges of integration to integration. The challenges include policy
challenges, Western Sahara conflict, interstate competition and leadership
competition. Moreover, the study attempts to map out prospects of integration
in the Arab Maghreb union. The prospects are based on the fact that, states are
becoming increasingly more interdependent on one another, the prospects of
development are better achieved when states pursue goals as a block than when
they pursue goals as unitary entities.
The
Maghreb, in Northern Africa, is the perfect example of a region whose countries
have been unable to find their way to a deeper integration. Only the most basic
level of cooperation exists between the region's five countries - Algeria,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia - despite the fact that the Maghreb Arab
Union was created more than 25 years ago with the aim of building a powerful
economic bloc in the region.
The
region's potential is enormous, especially if its countries can work together.
However, trade between the Maghreb countries represents just 4.8% of their
trade volume, according to the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa -
and it represents less than 2% of the sub-region’s combined gross domestic
product (GDP), according to the World Bank. This region is one of the
lowest-performing trading blocs in the world. If the five Maghreb countries were
integrated, each would gain a minimum 5% rise in GDP. A report by the World Bank on economic
integration in the Maghreb estimated
that deeper integration, including the liberalising of services and reform of
investment rules would have increased the per capita real GDP between 2005 and
2015 by 34% for Algeria, 27% for Morocco and 24% for Tunisia.
MEANING OF MAGHREB UNION
The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is a Maghrebian economic and integration organisation that seeks a Customs Union between the member countries and
the free movement of
people, services and products to complete the economic union of the Maghreb.
The Arab
Maghreb Union (AMU) is a trade agreement aiming for economic and future
political [citation needed] unity
among Arab countries of the Maghreb in North Africa.
Its
members are the nations of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The
Union has been unable to achieve tangible progress on its goals due to deep
economic and political disagreements between Morocco and Algeria regarding,
among others, the issue of Western Sahara.
No high level meetings have taken place since 3 July 2008, and
commentators regard the Union as largely dormant.
ORIGIN OF MAGHREB UNION
In June 1988, the Algerian, Libyan,
Mauritanian, Moroccan and Tunisian Heads of States met in Algiers to deliberate
the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union. The Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) was
founded in February 1989 in Marrakech with the approval of the Treaty
Instituting the Arab Maghreb Union. At the Treaty approval, the member States
agreed to coordinate, harmonize and rationalize their policies and strategies
to achieve sustainable development in all sectors of human activities. In
addition to the Treaty, the Marrakesh Summit adopted the Solemn Declaration on
the establishment of AMU and its work program.
The
idea for an economic union of the Maghreb began
with the independence of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956. It was not until thirty
years later, though, that five Maghreb states—Algeria,
Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia—met for the first Maghreb summit in
1988. The Union was established on 17 February 1989 when the treaty was
signed by the member states in Marrakech. According
to the Constitutive Act, its aim is to guarantee cooperation "with similar
regional institutions... [to] take part in the enrichment of the international
dialogue... [to] reinforce the independence of the member states and... [to]
safeguard... their assets." Strategic relevance of the region is based on
the fact that, collectively, it boasts large phosphate, oil, and gas reserves,
and it is a transit centre to southern Europe. The success of the Union would,
therefore be economically important.
AIM AND OBJECTIVES OF MAGHREB UNION
The
Arab Maghreb Union objectives are to:
v
Strengthen
the ties of brotherhood which link the member States and their peoples to one
another;
v
Achieving
progress and prosperity of their societies and defending their rights;
v
Contributing
to the preservation of peace based on justice and equity;
v
Pursuing
a common policy in different domains; and
v
Working
gradually towards achieving free movement of persons and transfer of services,
goods and capital among them.
OPERATIONS OF MAGHREB UNION
There
have been problems of traditional rivalries within the AMU. For example, in
1994, Algeria decided to transfer the presidency of the AMU to Libya. This
followed the diplomatic tensions between Algeria and other members, especially
Morocco and Libya, whose leaders continuously refused to attend AMU meetings
held in Algiers. Algerian officials justified the decision, arguing that they
were simply complying with the AMU Constitutive Act, which stipulates that the
presidency should in fact rotate on an annual basis. Algeria agreed to take
over the presidency from Tunisia in 1994, but could not transfer it due to the
absence of all required conditions to relinquish the presidency as stipulated
by the Constitutive Act.
Following
the announcement of the decision to transfer the presidency of the Union,
the Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi,
stated that it was time to put the Union "in the freezer". This
raised questions about Libya's position towards the Union. The concern was that
Libya would have a negative influence on the manner in which it would preside
over the organization.
Moreover, traditional rivalries between
Morocco and Algeria, and the unsolved question of Western Sahara's
sovereignty, have blocked union meetings since the early 1990s despite several
attempts to re-launch the political process. Western Sahara, a former Spanish
colony south of Morocco that was "reintegrated" by the kingdom
of Morocco, has declared independence as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.
The latest top-level conference, in mid-2005, was derailed by Morocco's refusal
to meet, due to Algeria's vocal support for Sahrawi independence. Algeria has
continuously supported the Polisario
Front liberation movement.
Several
attempts have been made, notably by the United Nations,
to resolve the Western Sahara issue. In mid-2003, the UN Secretary General's
Personal Envoy, James Baker, proposed a settlement plan, also
referred to as the Baker Plan II.
The UN's proposal was rejected by Morocco and accepted by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic.
As far as bilateral attempts are concerned, very little has been achieved, as
Morocco continues to refuse any concessions that would allow the independence
of Western Sahara, while Algeria maintains its support for the
self-determination of the Sahrawis.
In
addition, the quarrel between Gaddafi's Libya and Mauritania has not made the
task of reinvigorating the organisation any easier. Mauritania has accused the
Libyan Secret Services of being involved in a 2003 attempted coup against
President Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya. Libya has
denied the accusation.
The principal structures and
institutions of AMU are:
v The Presidency Council,
v The Consultative Council,
v The Secretariat,
v The Monitoring Committee,
v The Meeting of the Prime Ministers,
v The Council of Foreign Ministers,
v The Ministerial specialized
Commissions,
v The Judicial Organ,
v The University of Maghreb, and
v The Maghreb Bank for Investment and
Foreign Trade
ECONOMY OF MAGHREB UNION
The
Current member States of AMU are Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and
Tunisia. The economy of the AMU combines the economies of 5
member states. All countries are predominantly Muslim states. The 5 AMU
countries have a combined GDP (at purchasing power parity; PPP) of US
$1.276 trillion. The richest country on the basis of GDP per capita at PPP
is Algeria.
On the basis of per capita GDP (nominal), Libya is
the richest country, with incomes exceeding US $7.803 per capital.
Country
|
GDP (nominal)
|
GDP (PPP)
|
GDP (nominal)
per capita
|
GDP (PPP) per
capita
|
HDI
|
200,171,000,000
|
693,109,000,000
|
4,645
|
16,085
|
0.754
|
|
51,330,000,000
|
79,595,000,000
|
7,803
|
12,100
|
0.706
|
|
5,243,000,000
|
19,472,000,000
|
1,291
|
4,797
|
0.520
|
|
122,458,000,000
|
332,358,000,000
|
3,441
|
9,339
|
0.667
|
|
42,277,000,000
|
151,566,000,000
|
3,587
|
12,862
|
0.735
|
|
Arab Maghreb Union
|
421,479,000,000
|
1,276,100,000,000
|
4,169
|
12,622
|
0.707
|
ACHIEVEMENTS
OF MAGHREB UNION
Since the marrakech Swmnit in February
17, 1989, the Presidential council met several times:
v January
1990 (Tunis, Tunisia)
v July
1990 (Algier, Algeria)
v march
1990 (Tripoli, Libya)
v September
1991 (Casablanca, Morocco)
v November
1992 (Nouakchot, Mauritania)
The other different
committees set up by the protocol continue to meet regularly. Many agreements
and decisions were adopted during these sessions. For example, the review of
the relation between the Maghreb and the European Community (EC), the creation of
the Maghreb university, the Agricultural institute. Many other decisions were
adopted, which were related to transportation, investment, communication,
creation of the free zone, customs union, and the common market. Thus, the
Maghreb train seems well started, slowly, but surely. The participating states
seem very committed to this process of the region's integration. Already as we
saw previously, the Agenda set up in order to achieve this integration is very
positive and expresses the willingness of the members to work towards this
direction and achieve the region's integration. Already, we note the adoption,
in November 1990, of a common ID card, the free circulation of persons, while
waiting for the adoption of a common passport. The positive effect of these
decisions can be noted on the people of the region, thus, giving birth to the
flourishment of new associations (physicians, engineers, attorneys, press
reporters, editors, writers).
Since the foundation of
the AMU I trade between the Maghreb countries increased by an average of 34 .1%
per year. This move is very important, knowing that the inter-Maghreban trade
represents only a small percentage of their external exchange. Indeed, the
North African countries inter-trade represents 2. 68% of the total amount of
their foreign exchange. This figure is even more dramatic compared to the trade
with the European Community. It represents only 0.72%.
THE CHALLENGES OF MAGHREB UNION
The social unrest in the countries of
North Africa and the Middle East has a reciprocal effect, each nation’s strife
further unbalancing the others. The common problem that spans the region is
linked to the lack of political development in the majority of the MENA
nations. In addition, there have been serious imbalances in the economic and
social development across the region that remains significant despite various
reforms following the Arab Uprisings.
Many North African countries maintained
traditional systems of governance even after independence. In such systems, the
tribe has always played an important social and political role, and the
political systems retain a mixture of traditional and cultural mechanisms. The
recent shake-ups across the region reflect the urgent need to effect drastic
socio-political changes, which are part of the historical process of the
region’s social and political development. While the MENA region’s many
socio-political challenges vary depending on each nation’s cultural and
economic development, the prevalent theme of the region seems to be the belief that
the process of transformation and reform can only be achieved by overthrowing
the regime that holds the reins of power.
However, two nations have taken a
different tack. Tunisia and Egypt are becoming increasingly aware of the fact
that regime change may not be the answer to achieving economic prosperity or
immediately improving people’s lives. Rather, they are increasingly embracing
political and social reform, along with carefully chosen models of economic
development as the most important factors for achieving their desired outcomes.
In fact, even after Mubarak stepped down, the protests in Egypt went on
unabated, and protesters’ demands became more specific. They aimed at
accelerating the pace of political and economic reform in hopes of achieving a
better life.
The process of political and social
development in North Africa has reached a crossroads. Now, regional development
must be achieved at the hands of our future leaders of the region. Yet, no
clear reconstruction model has, thus far, emerged in any of the North African
nations. The strong and reliable leadership necessary to overcoming current
social unrest is sorely lacking. For the moment, the region will need a fair
dose of patience, tolerance and creativity as its people begin to imagine what
wise policy and true leadership might look like. Only then will overcoming
persistent issues related to borders, religion and traditions, and improved
economic outlooks begin to become a reality.
THE
REASONS BEHIND THE WEAKNESS OF THE MAGHREB NATIONS’ ECONOMIES
The Maghreb states are marked by very
weak economies. For example, unemployment rates in Morocco stand at 9.2 percent
and a shocking 31 percent in Mauritania. In terms of external debt, the picture
is equally bleak: Morocco leads the group with a debt load of some $39.2
billion. Likewise, the Maghreb nations – with the exception of the two oil
producing states, Algeria and Libya – uniformly face chronic trade deficits.
Beyond these dire signs, the decline in the Maghreb nations’ rankings on the
global human development index is particularly telling. According to the World
Bank classification, all of them are classified as developing countries, with
the exception of Mauritania, which is classified among the world’s least
developed nations.
These economic realities are not the
result of the Arab Uprisings, but rather, were caused by protracted problems,
notably the weakness of productivity, the imbalance in human resources, the
spread of corruption and the failure of the Maghreb Union.
v LOW PRODUCTIVITY
The
GDP of any country reflects the strength or weakness of its economy, not only
in terms of value, but in terms of the nature of its outputs. Typically, the
more productive and higher the added value is, the stronger the economy will
be. The more the economy relies on renter activities (i.e., it derives all or a
substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of
indigenous resources to external players) and the production of raw materials,
the weaker the economy.
The
combined GDP of the Maghreb nations’ economies was estimated at $439 billion in
2013. Algeria, an oil producing country, accounted for some 48 percent of
output. Mauritania, on the other hand, ranked last with about $4.1 billion in
production. Raw materials and extractive industries represent the backbone of
the Maghreb countries’ economies.
In
terms of the output components across the Maghreb, they are limited to raw
materials and extractive industries. In Libya, Algeria, and Mauritania,
extractive industries constitute the largest share of each nation’s output,
while manufacturing industries acquire the lion’s share in Tunisia and Morocco.
However, the manufacturing industries in Tunisia and Morocco are not oriented
toward technological output, but rather, toward traditional industries. This is
reflected in the low returns to GDP in both countries in terms of employment
rates, which are currently 9.2 and 13.2 percent, respectively.
v AN IMBALANCE IN HUMAN RESOURCES
The
total population of the several Maghreb nations is nearly 90 million. However,
this human wealth has not been well leveraged in moving the region’s economies
forward. The population growth rates across the Maghreb are uniformly higher
than GDP growth. This indicator is one of the most important signs of the
inefficient use of human resources. In Mauritania and Libya, the population
growth rate is 3.2 percent. In Algeria, the rate is less than 2 percent, while
in Tunisia and Morocco, the rate is around 1 percent.
The
region’s high illiteracy rates also attest to the weakness of human resources.
With high rates around 10.8 percent in Libya and 43.9 percent in Morocco, labor
productivity is impaired. Taken all together, it is clear that the politicians
and diplomatic decision-makers across the Maghreb must seek to transcend the
differences between the region’s states in order to implement a unified
mechanism for accelerating the Maghreb’s socio-economic development. With a
clear, unified vision, the nations of the Maghreb will become a major economic
force capable of imposing their presence on the geo-political scene and
competing with other powerful players in the future.
PROSPECTS OF MAGHREB UNION
The
new world order, the emergence of big trading blocks, and the increasing trends
of protectionism, it makes sense for the North African countries-small and
middle sized states to club together to promote their industry and commerce,
and to espouse a common economic policy toward their main trading partner, the
European Community, on which the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) is a loosely based.
We saw through this paper, that all the North African countries have the same
motives, urgency, ideology, and complementarities in seeking the economic
integration of the region. We saw also in the previous chapters that these
countries have similar backgrounds. They share religion, history, geographic
conditions, and cultural richness. The desire of the Maghreb leaders to
increase and strengthen economic cooperation within the region was not new. It
dates back to the pre-independence years. We argued that the revival of this
idea again was motivated by many factors, especially the national interest of
each member and especially as a response to the enlargement of the European
Community to involve new Southern European partners (Spain, Portugal, and
Greece).
In
my view, this approach should be examined from two directions, within and
outside the region.
1. Within the Haghreb Region:
One cannot ignore the importance of the institutional framework achieved by the
AMU Treaty. Although it constitutes a big achievement, much has to be done,
especially in redefining goals and expectations. Indeed, economic integration
is an excellent objective, and it can be done in a short period of time. This
is why it would probably be more realistic and tangible to seek more
intensified cooperation rather than integration. Intensified cooperation, for
several reasons, fits more into the actual Maghreban condition. First, the
goals and objectives of cooperation are less far-reaching and more specific
than those of integration. Second, the result of cooperation is more tangible,
and its success is perceivable over a short period of time. This creates less
political frustration. Third, cooperation projects are less costly than those
of integration in case members withdraw from the union. A clear definition of
the agenda should emphasize the concept of cooperation within the
member-states.
2. The Maghreb and the External
Environment: We saw through this paper that the
Maghreb interacts with many regional partners. Some of these partners are more
organized and show more efficiency and pragmatism in their policy (the EC);
others are less organized and lack efficiency and rationality in their interaction
(Sub-saharan region). The Maghreb organization should adopt a common and
rational policy towards its external partners. Indeed, it will be in the
interest of the entire region if the member-states avoid bilateral arrangements
and replace them with a global agreement valid for the entire region. This
means that the members of the AMU should cooperate and be in concert before
dealing with external partners. It would make no sense if the Moroccan and
Tunisian citrus industries compete to get into the European market or the
Tunisian and Algerian textile manufacturers to compete to penetrate the foreign
market. The immediate result will be a drop in the price of these commodities,
and consequently a negative effect on the economy of the concerned countries, and
the region as a whole.
And,
if the AMU has a single “raison d'etre”, it is to reduce the Maghreb dependency
on Europe by developing internal trade. The European small- scale economic
aid-currently 165 millions ecus ($200 million)- is likely to fall on stony
ground. The poorer members of the EC, already afraid that scarce cash will be
diverted to Eastern Europe, oppose any increase in aid for North Africa. The
European Community is becoming so obsessed with its own integration (and with
Eastern Europe) that it fails to help and teaming the Maghreb. The solution of
the economic development of the North African countries is within the region
and the AMU member-states themselves. External aid cannot be expected to
relieve the region itself.
CONCLUSION
The
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) inspired high hopes at its inception in 1989. The
landmark agreement, signed by Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia,
promised to foster political and economic unity between the Maghreb countries
with a combined population of approximately 100 million people.
Leaders,
businessmen and regular citizens hoped to benefit from being at the crossroads
of the Arab League, which speaks for the interests of 300 million, and of the
African Union grouping of more than 1 billion. It was an optimistic vision,
offering growth and empowerment for a region emerging from centuries of
colonialism. Leaders and elites said the AMU would help the Maghreb use its
position between the Atlantic and Mediterranean to function as a trade hub. It
could help utilise what were thought to be vast potential reserves of oil, gas,
uranium and water to jump-start an economic boom.
The
lessons learned from history show that nations can only count on themselves.
All foreign assistance is self interested and generated for the single purpose
to serve its donor. The Maghreb countries should primarily rely on themselves,
on their willingness and hard work to reach the level of viable economic
development. Cooperation should be initiated at all levels, but especially at
the economic level, by the sharing of burden and benefit in projects of
supranational importance. Cooperation should be viewed as a tool for solving
concrete economic problems in the short run and not as an ultimate political
aim.
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